Closed-Circuit Television Testimony for the Sexually Abused Child: The Right to Avoid Confrontation by Napoli, James A.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 27 | Number 1 Article 6
1-1-1987
Closed-Circuit Television Testimony for the
Sexually Abused Child: The Right to Avoid
Confrontation
James A. Napoli
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
James A. Napoli, Comment, Closed-Circuit Television Testimony for the Sexually Abused Child: The Right to Avoid Confrontation, 27
Santa Clara L. Rev. 117 (1987).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss1/6
CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION TESTIMONY FOR
THE SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD: THE RIGHT TO
AVOID CONFRONTATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1347 to
protect child victims of sexual abuse.' The statute concerns the
victim's testimony against the alleged assailant in all criminal pro-
ceedings.2 It permits contemporaneous direct and cross-examination
to be conducted by two-way closed-circuit television.' Under the sec-
tion 1347 procedure, the child is located outside the courtroom and
out of the presence of the defendant.' Attorneys communicate ques-
tions to the child from the courtroom via closed-circuit television, and
the child responds to the courtroom in the same manner. The proce-
dure substitutes live two-way television for in-court testimony.
This comment analyzes the issue of whether section 1347 denies
defendants the sixth amendment right to confrontation. First, it
describes problems of prosecuting a sexual abuse case with a child
victim. Second, it defines the right to confrontation and explains sec-
tion 1347. Next, it considers judicial standards of review for deter-
mining whether section 1347 unconstitutionally infringes a defend-
ant's right to confrontation. Finally, the comment recommends
several proposals aimed at improving the statute and insuring the
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1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1985). The statute became effective May 18, 1985.
The intent of the Legislature in enacting this section is to protect the rights of a child witness,
ihe rights of the defendant, and the integrity of the judicial process. In employing the statute,
the court will be required to balance the rights of the defendant against the need to protect a
child witness.
2. "[Tlhe court in any criminal proceeding ... may order the testimony of a minor ten
years of age or younger . . . to be taken by . . . two-way closed-circuit television." Id. at §
1347(b).
3. Closed-circuit television is an installation in which the signal is transmitted by wire to
a limited number of receivers. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 211 (3d ed.
1973).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (West 1985).
5. Id.
6. The California Public Defenders Association and California Attorneys for Criminal
Justice are two groups who will mount legal efforts to overturn the new law. A lobbyist for the
groups said the new law interferes with the defendant's right to confront his or her accuser.
L.A. Daily J., May 21, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
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defendant's right to confrontation. The first proposal is a higher
proof burden to permit use of the procedure. The second and third
proposals are additions to the statute; one suggests a specific method
of executing the procedure, and the other addresses a problem which
arises when the defendant opts for self-representation. The last pro-
posal suggests banning the statute if it significantly infringes the de-
fendant's right to confrontation.
II. BACKGROUND
Child sexual abuse has grown to extraordinary proportions in
recent years. 7 Since the first major sexual abuse case,8 prosecutors
have forced cases to trial, rather than dismiss them to spare embar-
rassment of young victims.9 The cases are exceptionally difficult to
prosecute because the child victim is usually the only witness to the
crime.10 He or she may be found incompetent to testify, or upon
testifying may be unable to recall crucial details or relate them to the
jury." Children are easily confused by cross-examination. They are
reluctant witnesses and sometimes retract prior testimony to absolve
an assailant who is a family member." Child therapists argue stead-
fastly that children often fall apart or retract their accusations on the
witness stand because they are frightened of the defendants." Par-
ents sometimes decline to press charges rather than subject their
abused children to litigation requiring repetition of a traumatic epi-
sode." Undoubtedly, the criminal justice procedure creates potential
for secondary victimization 5 of the sexually abused child.
7. Studies indicate that during childhood approximately 20% of all females and 10% of
all males are sexually molested by an adult. D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHIL-
DREN 53 (1979) (citing survey results).
8. In September, 1983, charges of sexual abuse were brought against an employee of the
Virginia McMartin Preschool in Manhattan Beach, California. Six other employees were
later arrested and charged with 208 counts of child molestation and conspiracy involving 42
children. NAT'L L.J., Sept. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
9. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
10. Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Potential for Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM.
JUST. J. 1 (1983).
11. See A. YARNEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 204-05 (1979)
(arguing that children possess inferior long-term and short-term memories).
12. D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 2-3 (1984).
13. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
14. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecution: Two Legislative
Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 807 (1985).
15. Secondary victimization, as used here, is intended to identify components of the legal
proceedings that are capable of putting a child victim under prolonged mental stress and en-
dangering his emotional equilibrium: repeated interrogations and cross-examination, facing the
accused again, the official atmosphere in the court, the acquittal of the accused for want of
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The California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1347 to
reduce the potential for secondary victimization of abused children.16
The statute focuses on protecting the victim's rights during examina-
tion and cross-examination." It attempts tobalance the rights of the
children against the defendant's right to confrontation, 8 and to
maintain the judicial integrity of the criminal defense procedure.
A. Right to Confrontation
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witness against him."' 9 The right
to confrontation applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment."0 The fact that the clause appears in the Bill of Rights reflects
the Framer's belief that confrontation is a fundamental right, essen-
tial to a fair trial in criminal prosecution.2' Moreover, United States
Supreme Court decisions consistently emphasize the necessity for
cross-examination as protection for criminal defendants.2"
The confrontation clause requires the accuser's appearance at
trial for several reasons. First, it enables the defendant to confront
the witness face to face in the presence of the jury.28 Second, it per-
mits the jury to examine the demeanor of the accuser and the man-
ner in which he testifies.2 ' Third, it prevents the use of ex parte
affidavits and depositions in lieu of personal examination.28 Finally,
corroborating evidence to the child's trustworthy testimony, and the conviction of a molester
who is the child's parent or relative. See Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual
Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 984 (1969).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(a) (West 1985).
17. Id. at § 1347(a)-(b).
18. Id. at § 1347(a).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) ("We hold today that the Sixth Amend-
ment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is. . . a fundamental right
and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.).
21. Id. at 404.
22. Id. See, e.g., Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1899); Alford v. United
States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965).
23. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). The defendant was convicted of
murder but the decision was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The confrontation issue
arose when, at the new trial, the government read into evidence the testimony of two witnesses
from the former trial, who had since died. The testimony provided strong evidence and the
defendant was convicted again.
24. Id.
25. Id. The following quote from Mattox is frequently used to demonstrate the rights
under the confrontation clause:
The primary object of the constitutional provision . . . was to prevent dep-
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it forces the witness to testify under oath.2 6 Ultimately, the confron-
tation clause intends to enhance the truth-seeking process by having
the accuser present at trial.27
The confrontation clause constitutionally guards against fla-
grant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers and absentee witnesses.2 8
Having established a broad principle, the Framers anticipated it
would be supplemented, as a matter of common law, by the rules of
evidence. 8 Thus, whether or not a witness is "available" under the
rules of evidence, affects the defendant's right to confront the
accuser. 80 An available witness must testify in court, but an unavail-
ositions or ex parte affidavits . from being used against the prisoner in lieu
of personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the ac-
cused has an opportunity not only of testing the recollection and sifting the con-
science of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury
in order that they look at him, and judge his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony, whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 242-43.
26. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). Respondent was convicted of fur-
nishing marijuana to a minor, in violation of California law, chiefly on the basis of evidence
consisting of prior inconsistent statements made by the minor at respondent's preliminary
hearing and to a police officer. The Court ruled the purposes of the confrontation clause were
satisfied since the witness testified at the trial under oath and was subject to cross-examination.
27. Cross-examination is the "greatest legal engine ever invented for discovery of truth."
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (1940).
28. Green, 399 U.S. at 179. A famous example is provided by the trial for treason of Sir
Walter Raleigh in 1603. A crucial element of evidence against him consisted of statements of
one Cobham, implicating Raleigh in a plot to seize the throne. Raleigh had since received a
written retraction from Cobham and believed that Cobham would now testify in his favor.
After a lengthy dispute over Raleigh's right to have Cobham called as a witness, Cobham was
not called, and Raleigh was convicted. Id. at 157 n.10, reprinted from J. STEPHEN, A His-
TORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326, 333-36 (1883).
29. Green, 399 U.S. at 179.
30. CAL. EVID. CODE § 240 (West 1985). Section 240 provides:
"Unavailable as a witness". (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivi-
sion (b), "unavailable as a witness" means that the declarant is:
(1) Exempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying con-
cerning the matter to which his statement is relevant;
(2) Disqualified from testifying to the matter;
(3) Dead or unable to attend or to testify at the hearing because of then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity;
(4) Absent from the hearing and the court is unable to compel his attend-
ance by its process; or
(5) Absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has exer-
cised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his attendance by the
court's process.
(b) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, preclusion,
disqualification, death, inability, or absence of the declarant was brought about
by the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the
purpose of preventing the declarant from attending or testifying.
1987] SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD
able witness is excused from testifying.
This rationale is based in logic and anchored in precedent.81 In
West v. Louisiana,"2 the United States Supreme Court reviewed
early confrontation decisions and emphasized "availability" as the
thread that tied the decisions together.8" Furthermore, Justice
Harlan concluded in California v. Green, 4 that in a criminal case,
a state may not use hearsay" when the declarant is "available." '86
Since the confrontation guarantee is limited by the availability
rule, cross-examination is not mandated in every case. 87 In Ohio v.
Roberts,88 the Supreme Court stated that a literal reading of the con-
frontation clause would require the exclusion of any statement made
by a declarant not present at trial. 9 But, if thus applied, the clause
would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result rejected as
unintended and too extreme.40
Invariably, Supreme Court cases dealing with the right to
confrontation involve hearsay evidence. Roberts establishes two re-
quirements for admitting the out-of-court statements of a declarant
who does not testify. First, the state must demonstrate that the de-
clarant is "unavailable. '41 Second, the hearsay evidence must bear
31. Green, 399 U.S. at 183 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. 194 U.S. 258 (1904). The confrontation issue arose in this case because a district
attorney read into evidence the testimony from a preliminary hearing of one Thebaud, after
having proved that he was permanently absent from the state and was a non-resident thereof,
and that his attendance could not be procured.
33. Green, 399 U.S. at 183 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 172.
35. "Hearsay evidence" is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a wit-
ness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1200 (West 1985).
36. Green, 399 U.S. at 183 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 182. The Supreme Court, in Mattox, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), recognized dying
declarations and the trial testimony of a of a subsequently deceased witness as exceptions to the
confrontation clause. In justifying these exceptions, the Court stated that "general rules of law
. . . must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the
case." Id. at 243.
38. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts was charged with forgery of a check and with posses-
sion of stolen credit cards. Defense counsel questioned his own witness at a preliminary hear-
ing and attempted to elicit from the witness that she gave permission to the defendant to use
the check and credit cards. The witness denied this. The defendant's attorney did not ask to
have the witness declared hostile and did not request permission to cross-examine her. The
confrontation issue arose when the witness did not appear at trial and the witness' previous
testimony was submitted into evidence.
39. Id. at 63.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 66. The test of unavailability is whether a state is powerless to compel a
witness' attendance. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 210 (1972) (citing Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968)).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
adequate "indicia of reliability." '42
A number of United States Supreme Court decisions illustrate
when the right to cross-examine is mandatory.4 In Pointer v.
Texas," a defendant convicted of robbery brought a sixth amend-
ment challenge to his conviction. The trial court had permitted the
prosecutor to read into evidence a transcript of the preliminary hear-
ing, which included the victim's testimony. 4 The defendant was not
represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing and did not cross-
examine the witness. The victim left the state and was "unavailable"
at the time of trial.
Based upon these facts, the Supreme Court found that the de-
fendant had been denied the right to confrontation.' The Court also
stated that the case would have been quite different if the victim's
statement had been taken at a full-fledged hearing which afforded
the defendant a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-
examine.4 7 Consequently, it can be implied that the right to confron-
tation can be satisfied with adequate cross-examination outside the
courtroom prior to trial.
In Douglas v. Alabama,"" the petitioner and an alleged accom-
plice were tried separately for assault with intent to murder. The
accomplice was called as a state witness in the petitioner's trial, but
refused to testify on grounds of self-incrimination. The prosecutor,
over the petitioner's objection, read the accomplice's confession into
evidence. The jury convicted the petitioner. 4' The Court held that
the inability to cross-examine the accomplice about the confession
denied the petitioner the right to cross-examination guaranteed by
the confrontation clause.50
Undeniably, the right to confrontation is a fundamental and
essential right. As demonstrated, however, it is not absolute, but is
42. 448 U.S. at 66. A state can demonstrate reliability by showing either that the evi-
dence falls within a firmly established hearsay exception or that it bears particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness.
43. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-20
(1965). In Douglas the petitioner and an alleged accomplice were tried separately in Alabama
state court for assault with intent to murder. The Court held that the petitioner's inability to
cross-examine the alleged accomplice about the accomplice's purported confession denied the
petitioner the right to confrontation.
44. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
45. Id. at 401-02.
46. d. at 406.
47. Id. at 407.
48. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
49. Id. at 417.
50. Id. at 419.
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limited by the availability of the accuser.5' Equally undeniable is the
necessity to protect sexually abused child witnesses from a poten-
tially traumatic cross-examination. Thus, the Legislature faces the
dilemma of protecting the well-being of the children while guaran-
teeing the defendant's right to confrontation.
B. California Penal Code § 1347
Faced with the difficulties of prosecuting child sexual abuse
cases, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1347. *5
By providing judges with the discretion to employ this procedure, the
Legislature expressly intended to protect the rights of a child wit-
ness, the rights of the defendant and the integrity of the judicial
process.
Section 1347 allows the court, upon motion5 in any criminal
proceeding involving a sexual offense,55 to order the testimony of a
minor who is ten years of age or younger" to be taken by contempo-
raneous examination and cross-examination, in another place.57 Such
testimony is then communicated to the courtroom by a two-way
closed-circuit television.55  The statute defines the preliminary re-
quirements needed to employ the procedure." The minor's testimony
must involve recitation of the facts of an alleged sexual abuse com-
mitted on or with the minor. 60 In addition, the child must be
"unavailable" as a witness." The statute enumerates criteria in
which the prosecution must clearly and convincingly prove that a
child is unavailable as a witness unless closed-circuit television is
used. 2'
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1985).
53. Id. at § 1347(a).
54. Id. at § 1347(b).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at § 1347(b)(1).
61. Id. at § 1347(b)(2).
62. Section 1347(b)(2) provides:
(2) The impact on the minor of one or more of the factors enumerated in
subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, is shown by clear and convincing evidence
to be so substantial as to make the minor unavailable as a witness unless closed-
circuit television is used.
(A) Threats of serious bodily injury to be inflicted on the minor or a family
member, of incarceration or deportation of the minor or a family member, or of
removal of the minor from the family or dissolution of the family, in order to
1987]
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Prior to enactment of section 1347, a judge in a major sexual
abuse case" ruled that children could testify through closed-circuit
television. 4 However, the judge was forced to overturn this ruling
when Hochheiser v. Superior Court6 was decided.
In Hochheiser, a defendant charged with engaging in lewd con-
duct with a minor sought a writ of prohibition."6 The writ attempted
to restrain the trial court from enforcing its order directing the com-
plaining witness to testify outside the courtroom using closed-circuit
television. 7 The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in
ordering the use of closed-circuit television.68 It stated that closed-
circuit television is a far-reaching innovation that is more appropri-
ately left to the Legislature for initial consideration because closed-
circuit television testimony raises significant constitutional issues
which potentially affect the defendant's right to confrontation. 9
prevent or dissuade the minor from attending or giving testimony at any trial or
court proceeding or to prevent the minor from reporting the alleged sexual of-
fense or from assisting in criminal prosecution.
(B) Use of a firearm or any other deadly weapon during the commission of
a crime.
(C) Infliction of great bodily injury upon the victim during the commission
of a crime.
(D) Conduct on the part of the defendant or defense counsel during the
hearing or trial which causes the minor to be unable to continue his or her
testimony.
In making the determination required by this section, the court shall con-
sider the age of the minor, the relationship between the minor and the defendant
or defendants, any handicap in or disability of the minor, and the nature of the
acts charged. The minor's refusal to testify shall not alone constitute sufficient
evidence that the special procedure described in this section is necessary in order
to obtain the minor's testimony.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2)(A)-(D) (West 1985).
63. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
64. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 18, 1985, at 20, col. 2.
65. 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). The case presented an issue of
first impression concerning the power of the trial court, in the absence of specific statutory
enabling legislation, to promulgate radically new procedures for alleged minor victims to testify
via closed-circuit television.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 780, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 274. The prosecution presented testimony by the vic,
tim's parents in support of using closed-circuit television to prevent psychological harm. The
father of ten year old T.B. testified at a preliminary hearing that his son, who was "shy about
his private parts," had said he did not want to talk about the incident in front of a lot of
people. The father also testified T.B. "went through several nights of nightmares and a round
of bed-wetting." Id.
68. Id. at 787, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
69. Id. at 785-87, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 276-79. (specifically stating that the ruling does not
reach constitutional issues).
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As a result of the ruling in Hochheiser,7" the therapists, prose-
cutors and parents involved in the major sexual abuse case, discussed
supra, urged the Legislature to approve closed-circuit testimony.71
They argued that children would sustain permanent emotional dam-
age if forced to testify in the presence of the defendant.7 2 The propo-
nents of the legislation point out that most children are frightened of
the defendants." "These kids are terrified," said Kee McFarlane, a
nationally prominent child therapist.7 4  "They are absolutely
terrified." '75
Opponents of section 1347 vigorously have fought for the right
to have defendants present when children testify."6 They claim the
law interferes with the defendant's right to confront his or her ac-
cuser. 77 The opponents claim that allowing a witness to testify from
outside the courtroom gives the jury the impression that the defend-
ant is so dangerous, the victim cannot be allowed to sit in the same
room. 
78
A defense attorney in the case said that the issue is particularly
acute with his client because the evidence against her is the alleged
victim's identification of her assailant. 7' If the child only views the
defendant through a television monitor, the ability of the accuser to
make a credible identification will be fatally impaired. S"
From the foregoing, it is apparent that California Penal Code
section 1347 is a controversial procedure because it potentially denies
defendants the fundamental right to confrontation. The balance of
this comment considers how courts may address this issue.
70. Id. at 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
71. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
72. Id. "Although children have testified in court in sexual molestation cases before in
Los Angeles, the McMartin case is seen as pivotal because it involves a large number of young
children who were allegedly frightened into years of silence and submission by death threats."
Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. ("Kee McFarlane, . has been instrumental in aiding the Los Angeles district
attorney in prosecuting the McMartin case. McFarlane interviewed the students from the Mc-
Martin school and helped prosecutors determine whether the children had been molested."
Id.).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. L.A. Daily J., May 18, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
78. Id. ("[Defense lawyers [also] contend that there is no scientific evidence to prove the
assertion that testimony in court can cause emotional and psychological harm." Id.).
79. Id.
80. Id.
19871
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III. ANALYSIS
A challenge claiming section 1347 violates a defendant's right to
confrontation raises an issue of first impression. Therefore, the ana-
lytical structure used to resolve the challenge is undetermined. The
following analysis suggests and applies three judicial options for
resolving the issue: an absolute ban,"1 equal protection 2 and the di-
rect use of strict scrutiny if the statute infringes a defendant's right
to confrontation.88
At the outset of the analysis, it is important to note that any
constitutional challenge must satisfy three preliminary requirements
before a court can address the issue on its merits: jurisdiction, jus-
ticiability and government action." This analysis assumes the
requirements are satisfied and only considers the issue on its merits.
A. Absolute Ban
A ban requires a court to strike down a statute as unconstitu-
tional if the court deems it a significant infringement of a particular
right.8" Thus, the crucial question in the present situation is whether
81. The absolute ban approach was applied by the concurrence in Regents of the Univ.
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), when addressing reverse racial dis-
crimination under equal protection: "[A]ny statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group
or singles out those least well represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign
program." Id. at 361.
82. See GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 586-93 (10th ed.
1983) [hereinafter GUNTHER].
83. For an example of a direct use of strict scrutiny to protect a constitutional right, see
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1981): "Where ... the state attempts
to deny the right of access [of the press to criminal trials] in order to inhibit the disclosure of
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling govern-
mental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 606-07. See, e.g., Brown
v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97,
101-03 (1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
84.
Jurisdiction presents no problem in this situation because it is a criminal prose-
cution. Furthermore, state courts may be called upon to review the constitution-
ality of . . . state . . . laws in the course of deciding cases before them. ...
Decisions from state courts are reviewable by the United States Supreme Court
. . . where a state statute is drawn in question on grounds of its being repug-
nant to the Constitution.
J. NOWAx, R. ROTUNDA, J. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20, 25 (1983).
In order for a claim to be justiciable, it must "present a real and substantial controversy
which unequivocally calls for adjudication of the rights claimed." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 509 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring). The government action in the present situation is
the enactment of the statute.
85. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 360 U.S. 599, 607 (1960).
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section 1347 infringes a defendant's right to confrontation.
The threshold issue is what criteria are used to make this deter-
mination. Case law can provide authority to support arguments with
respect to the appropriate criteria, however, as discussed," cases
where defendants claimed denial of the right to confrontation in-
volved hearsay evidence.87 The focus was on the trustworthiness of
hearsay submitted into evidence without the defendant's cross-exami-
nation of the unavailable declarant. The present situation is
distinguished from those cases because it involves contemporaneous
examination and cross-examination. Thus, simply using the criteria
employed in the hearsay cases is inappropriate for the present situa-
tion. However, advocates can look to those cases for the essential ele-
ments of the right to confrontation.
Advocates claiming significant infringement of the right to con-
frontation might focus on Mattox v. United States.8 This case indi-
cates that face to face confrontation between the accuser and the de-
fendant, in the presence of the jury, is an essential element of the
right to confrontation. 9
Challengers might argue that because the statute mandates the
use of television, it significantly infringes the right to confrontation
in various ways. First, the procedure denies the jury a full opportu-
nity to observe the demeanor of the witness. The jury observes only
what the camera reveals. If the television projects the witness' face,
the jury is unable to notice the wringing of hands or a nervously
tapping foot. The statute's general requirements compound this
problem by failing to specifically address crucial details regarding
execution of the procedure. Excluded details include camera angles,
number of cameras used, and whether broad scenes, close-ups or
something in-between most accurately conveys the witness' image.90
86. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
87. Pointer, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Mattox, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970); West, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Douglas, 380 U.S. 415
(1965).
88. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
89. 156 U.S. at 244 ("The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the
prisoner . . . seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-
examination." Id.).
90. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278, states:
[T]here are serious questions about the effects on the jury of using closed-
circuit television to present the testimony of an absent witness since the camera
becomes the juror's eyes, selecting and commenting upon what is seen. ...
[Tihere may be significant differences between testimony by closed-circuit televi-
sion and testimony face to face with the jury because of distortion and exclusion
of evidence.
1987]
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Second, challengers may argue that the procedure critically
handicaps the defendant's ability to cross-examine the witness. Face
to face confrontation enables a defendant to pressure a witness into
telling the truth. The witness might not feel this pressure from an
electronic image. The witness avoids confrontation with the defend-
ant and merely confronts a camera. The accuser never looks into the
defendant's eyes, but only at a television screen.
Third, television may critically hamper a witness' ability to
identify the defendant. A person appears slightly different on televi-
sion. The jury can never be sure the accuser has accurately identified
the defendant.
Opponents of section 1347 may thus argue that television causes
fundamental changes in human perceptions, reactions and judg-
ments. The totality of the circumstances indicates that two-way
closed-circuit television does not preserve a defendant's essential right
to confront his accuser. It infringes face to face confrontation, an
essential element of the right, and creates a sufficient negative impact
to justify an absolute ban of the statute.
On the other hand, proponents can rebut the preceding argu-
ments by claiming Green,91 not the dicta in Mattox cited by the
opponents, defines the essential elements of the sixth amendment
right. Green lists three essential criteria to protect the right. First,
the witness must testify under oath,"s and this is satisfied by section
1347(h). Second, the witness must submit to cross-examination."'
Proponents will contend that section 1347 fulfills this requirement
because its ultimate purpose is to accomodate examination and cross-
examination. The last criterion states a jury must observe the
witness' demeanor.9 4 Section 1347(b)(3) satisfies this criterion by re-
quiring that the television accurately communicate the image and de-
meanor of the minor to the judge, jury, defendant and attorneys.
Thus, the proponents of section 1347 can maintain that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the defendant is afforded the right to
confrontation, and the statute is constitutional.
In the present situation, regardless of the criteria used, and un-
til there is empirical evidence, the efficacy of the statute in affording
the defendant the right to confrontation remains an unanswered
question. Section 1347 has never been employed, thus there are no
Id.
91. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
92. 399 U.S. at 158.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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concrete facts to consider. This analysis is not intended to exhaust
definitive arguments, but rather to illustrate the framework of an
absolute ban. The important aspect of the analysis is that the statute
is stricken as unconstitutional if the court deems it a significant in-
fringement of the defendant's right to confrontation.
B. Equal Protection
The fundamental rights strand of equal protection"8 is the sec-
ond judicial option considered in this analysis. The threshold issue is
whether the statute classifies a certain group by treating them differ-
ently than the rest of society. If there is a classification, the analysis
proceeds with an examination of the government's justification for
the classification.
Section 1347 facially classifies criminal defendants accused of
sexually abusing a child ten years of age or younger because it sin-
gles these people out for special treatment. The statute potentially
denies these defendants the right to confront the child face to face in
the presence of a jury. It subjects them to a different trial process
from all criminal defendants. No other defendants face the possibility
of an accusing witness testifying via closed-circuit television. Assum-
ing that the court determines there is a classification, the analysis
next proceeds with an examination of the government's justification
for the classification.
Initially, this consists of two issues: whether the right involved
is a fundamental right, and whether there is a significant infringe-
ment of that right. As with an absolute ban, if there is no
infringement, the statute is upheld as constitutional. However, unlike
an absolute ban, under equal protection, if there is a significant in-
fringement, the statute is subject to means-ends scrutiny" instead of
automatic repeal. If the right infringed is fundamental, the test is
strict scrutiny. If the right is not fundamental, the test is a rational
relationship.' 7
Under San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
the right to confrontation is a fundamental right because it is an
explicit constitutional right.'8 The more difficult issue is whether
95. See GUNTHER, supra note 82, at 787-89.
96. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 33-34. In this case, the Court indicated that a fundamental right for purposes
of equal protection "is a right ... explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id.
The right to confrontation is explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
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there is a significant infringement of the right. As demonstrated in
the absolute ban analysis, this issue cannot be resolved until the stat-
ute has been applied. However, if it is assumed section 1347 in-
fringes a fundamental right, the government must demonstrate that
the statute satisfies strict scrutiny. 99
Strict scrutiny operates on the presumption that the statute is
unconstitutional and thereby places the burden of proving the consti-
tutionality of the statute on the government. It demands a compelling
government interest, with means that are narrowly tailored to
achieve the interest.' 00 Furthermore, there cannot be a less onerous
alternative for achieving this interest. 10'
Legislative history indicates that section 1347 is intended to
protect the rights of child victims.' 02 It is reasonable to presume that
a court would consider this a compelling interest.' 03 Thus, the argu-
ments will focus on whether section 1347 is narrowly-tailored and
the least onerous alternative for achieving the interest. Some exam-
ples of alternatives less onerous than closed-circuit television are
allowing the defendant to leave the courtroom when the child testi-
fies or placing the defendant outside the child's eyesight. The absence
of a less onerous alternative demonstrates that the means are nar-
rowly drawn.
As with the infringement issue, these issues cannot be resolved
until the statute has been applied. The means and potential alterna-
tives can be considered in the abstract, but ultimately a concrete de-
termination must be based on the facts of a particular case.
C. Infringement-Strict Scrutiny
The final judicial option is a two-step analysis which consists of
two elements of equal protection. Under the first element, the court
must consider whether the statute significantly infringes a right. If
there is no infringement, the statute is upheld as constitutional.
However, if there is an infringement, the second element requires
the government to demonstrate that the statute satisfies strict scru-
tiny; otherwise the statute is struck down as unconstitutional.
The analysis does not consider any issues that are not addressed
in equal protection. However, it more directly arrives at the use of
99. See GUNTHER, SUPRA note 82, at 787-89.
100. 411 U.S. at 16-17.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
103. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
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strict scrutiny because there is no requirement that the statute is a
classification or the right involved is fundamental. Thus, a challenger
of section 1347 need only demonstrate a significant infringement of
the right to confrontation to compel strict scrutiny. As with equal
protection, the questions of whether there is an infringement and
whether the statute satisfies strict scrutiny, remain unanswered. Res-
olution depends on application of the procedure, a conviction, and a
challenge that the procedure unconstitutionally infringes the right to
confrontation.
IV. PROPOSALS
Penal Code section 1347 must require a stricter standard of
proof regarding the child's unavailability as a witness in order to
withstand a constitutional challenge. Furthermore, it must include a
provision regarding the specific execution of the procedure and ad-
dress the situation which arises when the defendant opts for
self-representation. Finally, the appropriate standard of review with
respect to the right to confrontation is an absolute ban.
A. Increase Proof Requirement
Section 1347 requires clear and convincing evidence that the
child is unavailable as a witness to permit the use of closed-circuit
television. 10 4 The proof requirement must be heightened to the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard because this statute impairs a
fundamental right and must require the strictest standard of proof to
justify its application. Finally, the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard strengthens the statute's ability to withstand a constitutional
challenge because it minimizes doubt as to whether the use of closed-
circuit television is warranted.
B. Specific Method of Execution
A second proposal is an amendment to the statute which deline-
ates a specific method of execution. The amendment must include
specific language concerning camera angles, number of cameras used,
scope of the image projected and similar items. This necessitates con-
sultation with television experts. The California Legislature should
tap the expertise of the television industry and solicit information
prescribing the most efficient method to execute the procedure. It is
quite likely that experts can define a formula which virtually guar-
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1985).
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antees the accurate transmission of the witness' image and demeanor
to the courtroom. A uniform method with specific requirements
creates less chance for error in the application of the procedure. Ulti-
mately, it helps ensure the defendant's right to confrontation by
guaranteeing effective communication during cross-examination.
C. Appoint Counsel
The next recommendation addresses the situation which arises
when the defendant opts for self-representation. Section 1347 per-
mits the judge to question the child in chambers to aid in his
determination of whether the use of closed-circuit television is war-
ranted.1"' The prosecutor and defense counsel may submit questions
for the child and attend the session, but the defendant is excluded
from the process. Thus, when the defendant opts for self-representa-
tion, he is excluded from any in camera questioning of his accuser.
The California Legislature should simply add a provision to section
1347(f) which directs the court to appoint counsel for the limited
role of attending this meeting. This does not infringe on the defend-
ant's right to self-representation and ensures the presence of defense
counsel at the session.
D. An Absolute Ban as the Standard of Review
The final proposal recommends an absolute ban as the standard
of review in cases involving the right to confrontation and section
1347. Thus, if a court determines section 1347 significantly infringes
a defendant's right to confrontation, the statute is struck down as
unconstitutional. This is an appropriate response because the right
to confrontation is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights." 6 The Framers
of the Constitution balanced the social cost of the right of confronta-
tion against the benefits to society and determined the right to
confrontation is a fundamental right. An absolute ban as the stan-
dard of review insures a defendant this fundamental right and thus
preserves the integrity of the judicial criminal system.
While protecting the rights of sexually abused children is
essential, this goal should not be accomplished at the expense of a
fundamental right or the integrity of the judicial system. Further-
more, if the statute is deemed unconstitutional, the onus would be
placed on the Legislature to enact laws which both protect the rights
105. 1d. at § 1347(c)(3).
106. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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of child victims and insure fundamental rights.
V. CONCLUSION
California Penal Code section 1347 attempts to protect child
victims of sexual abuse from traumatic cross-examination by
allowing contemporaneous testimony via two-way closed-circuit tele-
vision. However, the statute may infringe a defendant's constitu-
tional right to confrontation. The confrontation issue may arise when
the procedure is employed and the criminal defendant is convicted.
This comment proposes amendments and a stricter burden of
proof to strengthen the statute with respect to a confrontation chal-
lenge. It addresses both the importance of protecting child victims
and the necessity to preserve the integrity of the judicial system by
ensuring a defendant the right to confrontation. Finally, this com-
ment recommends an absolute ban as the standard for reviewing the
confrontation issue because it advances both these goals. A ban
upholds the statute if there is no infringement of the right to con-
frontation. If there is an infringement, the statute is struck down as
unconstitutional, preserving a defendant's constitutional right and ju-
dicial integrity while placing the onus on the Legislature to address
the needs of child victims with effective laws.
Child victims of sexual abuse must have protection. It is the
responsibility of the Legislature and the judiciary to provide this
protection while preserving the fundamental rights of defendants and
the judicial integrity of the criminal justice system.
James A. Napoli
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